/priv/ - Privacy & Anonymity

• How it runs: boots entirely from a USB stick, leaves nothing on the host computer's internal drive when you shut down
• Network: routes all traffic through Tor by default, resets its MAC address on every boot to confuse network-level logging
• Persistence: optional encrypted partition if you want to keep select files between sessions - everything else still reverts to fresh on reboot
• Pre-installed: Tor Browser, KeePassXC, OnionShare, Thunderbird - the essentials already configured to leak as little as possible
• Not for: daily driving, heavy workloads, or a machine you actually own and trust - it's built for machines you don't

The right call for a single high-risk session on a computer that isn't yours - a library, an internet café, a borrowed laptop. Not a replacement for your everyday OS.

• Core idea: every task runs in its own isolated virtual machine ("qube") - a compromise in one doesn't reach the rest of the system
• Built on: the Xen hypervisor, so "work," "personal," and "sensitive" can be fully separated qubes that never touch each other
• Pairs with: Whonix qubes for Tor-routed work directly inside the compartmentalized setup
• Trade-off: resource-intensive (realistically wants 16GB RAM and an SSD), steep learning curve, not a casual weekend project
• Best for: people who need to keep genuinely separate contexts from ever leaking into each other - lawyers, security researchers, journalists with multiple sources

Widely considered the most secure desktop OS that exists, and that reputation is earned. The cost is real complexity - this is the "seriously consider it" option, not the default.

• Architecture: two virtual machines - a Gateway that routes all traffic through Tor, and a Workstation where you actually work, fully isolated from each other
• Why it matters: even if malware compromises the Workstation, it still can't discover your real IP, because the Workstation never talks to the network directly
• Vs. Tails: persistent rather than amnesic - you can save work and maintain state, unlike Tails' fresh-every-boot model
• Runs on: VirtualBox, KVM, or as qubes inside Qubes OS itself

The pick if you want Tor-level anonymity but also need a working environment that doesn't reset itself every time you shut down. More setup than Tails, more persistence in return.

• What it removes: Google Play Services and telemetry stripped out entirely by default
• Hardening: hardened memory allocator, strict app sandboxing, kernel-level mitigations beyond stock Android
• Hardware tie-in: uses the Pixel's Titan security chip for Verified Boot with user-controlled keys - tamper resistance stock Android doesn't offer
• App compatibility: can run Google Play apps in an optional sandbox if needed, without giving Play Services system-level access
• Limitation: only supported on Pixel hardware - no Samsung, no iPhone equivalent

The de-facto standard for a genuinely hardened phone in 2026. If mobile privacy matters to you, this is what security researchers and journalists' security teams actually recommend.